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ef one that ori9inally appeared at
ef M'<lr Website (www.crimesefwar.or9) as part ef a debate on

The jollowin9 essay is a rei•ised version
The Crimes

"Rethinkin9 the Geneva Conventions."

T

he so -called war on terrorism engaged in by the United
States and other states has prompted calls for re\'isions to

the 1949 Geneva Com·entions on armed conflict and the 1977

Misconception 1: International humanitarian law has amajor gap regarding the war
on terror.
A common assumption in favor of updating the law of war is

Additional Protocols thereto in order to address terrorist-related

that the existing corpus of international humanitarian law is ill-

warfare. In 2003, the International Committee of the Red Cross

equipped to address uses of force by and against terrorist groups.
Although the laws of war proYide detailed rules for interstate

began an informal dialogue with governmental and other experts
to consider this prospect. To some academics and non-govern-

conflicts, conflicts between states and liberation movements,

mental organizations, the discussions provide a long-overdue

and conflicts between states and well organized insurgencies,

opportunity to consider updating the Com-entions and Protocols

some claim that they do not provide guidance to those fighting
in wars between states and terrorist movements. It is, of course,

- to tailor them for a war they were never designed to address.
A new round of codification of international humanitarian law

undeniable that the Conventions and Protocols only cover what

would, it is said, be as important a response to terrorism as was

thev, cover. If one side in the conflict does not meet the defini-

the International Committee of the Red Cross' diplomatic confer-

tions provided in Common Article 2 of the Geneva Conventions

ence of the 1970s a response to anti-colonial wars and internal

( namely, a state party to the Conventions), Article 1(4) of

conflicts.
Although governments should ensure that the employment
of coercion against terrorists is regulated according to some

Protocol I (a state party or a national liberation movement), and

normative framework, I believe that claims for a major reform
of international humanitarian law are premised on a variety of
misconceptions of that law. As a result, any intergovernmental
process is not likely to lead to any significant new norms nor,
I believe, should it. I will suggest four misconceptions implicit
in calls for major reform and their implications for efforts to
augment the Conventions and Protocols. Before beginning, it

Article 1 of Protocol II (a state party or an organized insurgent
group in a civil war), the Conventions and Protocols qua treaties
simply do not govern the conflict.
But international humanitarian law has a sizeable "place -holder"
for all other conflicts
one that Protocol I explicitly recognizes:
"the principles of international law derived from established
custom, from the principles of humanity and from the dictates
of public conscience." These t erms are no mere rhetoric. At a
minimum, their content includes: (a) the principle of distinction,

bears emphasis that the abuses by U.S. forces at Abu Ghraib
prison in Iraq did not happen because international law sets

civilians, and that combatants must neither deliberately target

vague standards regarding the relevant conduct; in fact, the legal
framework for treatment of prisoners-of-war and civilians in

nor indiscriminately or disproportionately harm civilians; (b)
the status of hors de combat, under which combatants not taking

occupied territory is clear under the Third and Fourth Geneva
Conventions, as are the acts that constitute violations of those

part in hostilities shall be treated humanely; and (c) limitations
on methods of combat to those that do not cause "unnecessary

treaties.

suffering." These basic notions are admittedly vague around

i.e., that soldiers must distinguish between other combatants and

the margins. But states have recognized such obligations in all
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conflicts. Thus, while at first denying, and later limiting, the
application of the Geneva Conventions to its operations against
Afghanistan and Al Qaeda, the United States and its allies have
repeatedly stated their acceptance of basic principles of humanitarian law.
Indeed, the full scope of customary international humanitarian
law is far more detailed than these basic principles. If asked, most
states would point to numerous provisions of the 1907 Hague
Regulations and the Geneva Conventions and Protocols as still
binding in this conflict, even though it does not meet the definition of armed conflict in those instruments. For instance, the
ban on killing someone in the course of a bona fide surrender, as
well as the possibility to shoot those engaging in perfidy by faking
surrender (with some gray areas as to how the bona fides of the
surrender is determined), would seem well accepted .
This is not to suggest that every scenario in the "war on
terrorism" is addressed by customary international law. That, after
all, is why states draft treaties. Ambiguities over the definition
of combatant, the meaning of hostilities (and the end of them),
and other problems will remain beyond the scope of existing
customary international law simply because customary law has
not had time to develop regarding certain aspects of these new
conflicts. The question, however, is whether those ambiguities can
and should be resolved through a new round of codification or
whether other methods are open to decision makers.
The burden needs to be on those calling for revision to demonstrate exactly what needs to be improved. Are they asserting
that, under current law, combatants are underprotected, as when
members of terrorist groups are taken prisoner and not granted
POW status; or that they are overprotected, as when the U.S.
military targets and kills an Al Qaeda leader in Yemen and claims
this action is a legitimate engagement in an armed conflict?
Are civilians currently underprotected, as when they are killed
in collapsing buildings; or are they said to be overprotected,
because many members of terrorist cells, e.g., those organizing
or financing activities, never wear uniforms or ever show arms?
Even now, while the U.S . administration denies the applicability of
the POW provisions of Geneva Convention III to Taliban detainees
(almost certainly unjustified under that Convention) or Al Qaeda
detainees (more convincing under extant law), the ICRC is able to
monitor their conditions at a number of detention facilities .
More likely, the harms arise from the prospect that states, such
as the United States, may be claiming the right to kill terrorists
(as the U.S . government defines them) anywhere or detain them
indefinitely. This is a significant expansion of the notion of armed

conflict, and eats away at much of the traditional way of addressing
transnational crime, e.g., through extradition and trial. But if that
is the case, those inside and outside of governments should focus
on those narrow issues, rather than assume that international
humanitarian law has little to say about such conflicts.

Misconception 2: Jus in be/lo can and should be divorced from jus ad bellum.
One of the hallmarks of international humanitarian law since
the nineteenth century has been the need to protect victims of
armed conflict regardless of its cause or the blameworthiness of
the sides under the law governing recourse to force (jus ad bellum).
Today, the Conventions and Protocols apply equally to entities
acting unlawfully - in violation of the UN Charter's ban on
the use of force - and those acting lawfully - notably in selfdefense or under UN authority. Without such a clear distinction,
combatants would argue that the justness of their cause allows for
all sorts of indignities against combatants and civilians, defeating
the whole enterprise of international humanitarian law. With
regard to terrorism, the argument would be that the question of
who is right and who is wrong in the decisions by certain states
and non-state groups to use violence against each other should not
detract from the need to regulate that conflict in a humanitarian
manner.
The jus in belloljus ad bellum distinction is thus premised on
the idea - based on fundamental principles of humanity - that
all combatants and civilians deserve protections regardless of
the merits of their side. In addition, international actors may
well have other reasons for granting both sides protection. They
may understand the difficulty of knowing (or at least reaching
a consensus among states) in certain conflicts which side has
violated jus ad bellum by initiating the war; in these cases, it is
better to grant both sides protection.
But the reality is not as obvious as this distinction suggests.
First, the inclusion of wars of liberation in Protocol I's coverage
stemmed from the sense among many (but by no means all)
governments that certain struggles against colonial or alien
domination were legitimate; and even Protocol II's protections
recognize that insurgent groups might be engaging in a legitimate
activity. Second, even for wars that are illegal, i.e . , aggression
under the UN Charter, states seem to have found these not so
obnoxious to merit denying even the offenders humanitarian
protections. States quietly accept that wars still happen; that
aggression still occurs; and that they might, after all, eYen be
aggressors themselves one day. They are not willing to say that
the aggressor is so evil - that his goal is so beyond the pale of
LQN Summer 2005
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...
ciYilized conduct -

that he forfeits all protections for his troops

humanitarian law. Second, eYen the bans on reprisals in Protocol I
haYe their detractors, such as the United Kingdom, which issued a

and his ciYilians.
But what happens when we haYc non-state actors whose goal is
simply to kill innocent people and terrorize a population? While
not all groups labeled as terrorist by states haYc this goal
many
use attacks on ciYilians as a means to gain control of specific
territory (e.g., the IRA or Palestinian groups) -

....

there seems to

be no such goal for Al Qaeda. It has no leaders in waiting to take
O\·cr the United States or the United Kingdom. It claims to \\·ant

reserYation to that treaty allowing for the possibility of measured
reprisals against ci\·ilians if the opposing party itself engaged in
serious, deliberate attacks on ciYilians. Lastly, the granting of
protections in Protocol I was, in fact, part of a reciprocal bargain,
not simply extending protections to guerrilla groups as a gesture
of goodwill, but creating obligations for those moYcments as well.
Thus Protocol I denies combatant status to guerrilla groups that

those states to change their foreign policies on \·arious issues, but

do not follow certain requirements regarding open carrying of

there is also evidence that it is simply the way of life practiced
in these states that it finds a threat . In these situations, can and

arms.
The nature of terrorist organizations -

should g0Ycr111ncnts make the leap of faith that such conflict

emphasizes targeting of ch·ilians -

against organized states deserves regulation by detailed protec-

reciprocity CYcn further. One side is determined from the outset

tions of international humanitarian law? When the goal of a group

to carry out a struggle regardless of cYen the most fundamental

whose modus operandi

pushes the need for non-

is so beyond acceptable conduct that it finds no defenders among

principles of humanity. If these acts are not simply an aberra-

goYernments, extending the protections of international humanitarian law to such conflicts sen-es a legitimating function. Equally

tion but its principal way of operation, why should its members
be afforded anything more than treatment consistent with those

significant, key goYcrnments likely haYc the same fear, and arc

basic notions of humanity? (Some will suggest that they do not

unlikely to engage in a process that they will regard as tarnishing
international humanitarian la\\·.

e\'cn dcscnc that treatment, of course .) States will not and should

Misconception 3: The non-reciprocal nature of international humanitarian law
demands protection even for those entities that insist on violating it
Another mantra of humanitarian law is that, unlike much
international law, the targets of its norms deserve protection CYCn
if they thcmsch·es \·iolatc them. Thus, traditional norms of treaty
interpretation that permit a state to suspend its obligations in
the event of a material breach by the other side do not apply in
many key situations. At a minimum, reprisals - i.e., otherwise
unlawful acts taken in response to prior unlawful acts

against

POWs, ci\·ilians, and wounded, sick, and shipwrecked combatants
arc explicitly prohibited by Geneva Convention Ill (article 13),
GeneYa ConYention IV (article 33), and Protocol I (articles 20

not tolerate a legal regime whereby only one set of combatants
benefits from the protections of international humanitarian law.
This solution is not a recipe for a free-for-all in the war against
terrorism. International law is not a blank slate merely if the
Gcncn Com·cntions do not formally apply. As noted, basic principles of humanity still apply and are accepted, at least officially,
by goYcrnments. They would mean, for example, that terrorists
cannot be tortured upon capture and that their families cannot be
targeted.Yet to suggest that the international humanitarian law's
non -reciprocal approach to protections requires granting them a
Yast array of other protections, such as the combatant 's priYilege
(against prosecution) or POW status, is unwarranted .
At the same time, I recognize that extending POW status to

and 51 (6)). Some might call for the abolition of all reprisals based

those who formally do not legally merit it can sene a prophylactic function by creating additional pressures on their keepers to

on the underlying purposes of humanitarian law. Another form

treat them with respect. Despite administration promises to treat

of non-reciprocity appears in Protocol I's requirement (article
44(2)) that combatants do not lose their status c\·en if they \·iolatc

detainees humanely, it is now apparent that the February 2002

most norms of humanitarian law in the course of their operations.

Presidential decision to deny POW status to all those detained
at Guantanamo Bay sent a tacit signal to some military lawyers,

Under this non-reciprocity model, the Yiolations of international

interrogators, and administrators of U.S. detention facilities

humanitarian law by nrious terrorist groups should not be an

worldwide that a lesser degree of respect for detainee rights was
now acceptable. Once the familiar framework of the Geneva

excuse for denying them certain protections.
But non-reciprocity is not and should not be all-encompassing.
First, current humanitarian law does not preclude reprisals
during combat against combatants that might \·iolate international
68
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Com·cntions was remoYed, some actors within the government
pcrceiYed a legal ncuum, with the result that the promised
humane treatment often did not materialize.

Are the Geneva Conventions out of date?

Misconception 4: The paradigms of combat and combatants are out of date.
One argument made for the revision of the Conventions and
Protocols is that they reflect an outdated notion of what consti tute armed conflict and those participating in it. Thus, Al Qaeda 's
actions against the United States - whether against ci\'ilians or
military personnel, whether within the United States or abroad
- arc a form of armed conflict; and the U.S. actions in fighting,
capturing, and killing Al Qaeda forces - ,Yhcthcr in Afghanistan,
Pakistan, Yemen, or elsewhere
are equally armed conflict. The
argument is not that customary law docs not offer some protec tions, but that the Conventions and Protocols, which on their face
go\'ern only three sets of conflicts (state YS. state, state vs. national
liberation mm·emcnt, and state \'S . organized insurgency), need to
respond to the changing nature of armed conflict.
This apparent need for updating seems bolstered by the Yery
use of the war paradigm by states engaging with Al Qaeda. Thus,
the United States and its allies have used the rhetoric of armed
conflict to respond to the attacks of September 11. U.S. officials
refer to their operations a~ the"\\ ar" on terrorism; and the United
States has invoked its rights under jus ad bellum - UN Charter
Article 5 I's right of self-defense to an armed attack - in acting
against Afghanistan and Al Qaeda targets and personnel around
the world (a position I find justifiable at least with respect to the
operations in Afghanistan). The U.S. government relies on this
characterization to amid treating Al Qaeda as simply a criminal
organization that can be targeted only through traditional law
enforcement actiYitics, e.g., police investigations, extradition
requests, and ciYilian trials with full due process. Adrncatcs for
change say that the administration is trying to have it both ways
asserting nrious rights under jus ad bellum while denying the
applicability of key aspects of jus in bello .
It seems unquestionable that the United States and others arc
engaged in an armed conflict with Al Qaeda. But the subsidiary
concepts of combat operations and combatants that permeate
Hague and Gencn Law arc not and should not be infinitely
elastic. Part of the core of international humanitarian law is the
creation of physical and temporal space in which it is perfectly
legal for certain categories of people to kill each other: that space
is combat and those people arc combatants. The combatant's
pri,·ilege means that combatants (at least in international conflicts)
may not be punished for lawful combat operations, though, of
course, they can be punished for war crimes. The notions of
armed conflict, combat, and combatant haYc changed since the
days of the Hague ConYentions; today, the problems of determining whether the uncom·cntional nature of some armed forces'

garb (like the Taliban) sen-es to deny them combatant status arc
,,·ell known.
Yet, c,·cn with the expansion of the notion of armed conflict to
coYer acts by national liberation mo\'cmcnts in Protocol I, there
remain the ideas of the military engagement and the military
attack. For instance, under Protocol I, if a fighter docs not carry
his arms openly during the engagements as well as during the
deployment before an attack while ,·isiblc to the adYersary,
he is not a Ia,Yful combatant (entitled, for example, to POW
status). This compromise (though opposed by the United States)
prescn-cs the idea of combat operations and the special nature
of the combatant, who must distinguish himself from the ch·ilian
population in combat and the time leading up to it. The ban on
perfidy also reinforces this idea.
To expand the laws of wars to apply to any situation where an
organization (or concci\'ably an indi,·idual) initiates force is to
blur the distinction between cases where the law allows individuals to kill each other and those where the law prohibits it.
Under such a view, every attack on a military installation, cYen if
undertaken without any separation from the civilian population
(indeed, this is the modus operandi of many terrorist opcrati\'cs) is
per sea combat operation and those who carry it out combatants.
The result is to turn c,·cry act of Yiolcncc into an act of war, and
all those who commit it into lawful combatants who enjoy the
combatant's privilege. It infinitely expands the protected zone in
time and space. Where docs one draw the line between Al Qaeda
attacks and those of the mafia or simply an insane person? For
the combatant's prh·ilcgc to remain, as it should, a hallmark of
international humanitarian law, it must be confined to a highly
limited set of circumstances. States will not and should not agree
to extend it to any individual or group that chooses to attack a
military target.

Priorities for normative development
Of course, as noted, the United States government conceives of
the struggle against Al Qaeda as a war, and it wants to expand the
geographical zone of legitimate combat significantly - to cover,
for instance, the killing by remotely piloted vehicle of a suspected
Al Qaeda leader in Yemen . The executive branch also wants to
expand the notion of combat temporally. It refuses to talk about
an end to the hostilities, partly to justify the indefinite detention
without trial of Al Qaeda and Taliban personnel.
These two expansions of the notions of armed conflict, combat,
and combatant - geographical and temporal - are the most
,·exing questions for international humanitarian law today. On
LQN Summer 2005
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the geographical plane, it is hard to accept the U.S. position that
treats Al Qaeda operatives around the world as legitimate targets
for wartime killing while rejecting the idea that Al Qaeda operatives are acting as lawful combatants when they kill U.S. soldiers
anywhere in the ·world. The government squares the circle by
relying on the notion of the "illegal combatant," something that
international humanitarian law already accepts in terms of spies,
mercenaries, and guerrillas who do not meet the special requirements of carrying arms openly. This allows a state to kill them but
afford them fewer benefits when captured . But is there no limit to
how and where someone becomes such an illegal combatant?
The simplest solution is to say that the armed conflict paradigm
does not apply at all - that Al Qaeda's members are criminals
and that the United States should use law enforcement techniques to try and punish them, just like European states are
rounding up suspected members of Al Qaeda cells. Human rights
law, which governs peacetime law enforcement, still recognizes
significant discretion for police acting in genuine self-defense,
while protecting criminals from arbitrary killing by the state. The
question is whether this attitude will suffice in a world where
Al Qaeda can gain access to weapons of mass destruction. If
states treat the campaign against Al Qaeda as an armed conflict,
then they need to do so in a way that does not entail a wholesale
change in the notion of combat . The conflict with Al Qaeda needs
to have boundaries beyond which the special privileges that the
law of war gives to combatants do not apply.
As for the temporal question, namely the administration's
willingness to tolerate indefinite detention of Al Qaeda fighters,
it is surely unsustainable in the long term, as U.S. courts are
now recognizing. (As noted, its position on the Taliban seems to
be a misreading of the Conventions.) Humanitarian and human
rights law mandate that individuals
whether lawful combatants, civilians, or others - not be held indefinitely without trial.
But rather than recognizing some form of combatant status for Al
Qaeda and then trying to determine at what point hostilities cease
(so that they would have to be released), another possibility is
available. They should enjoy protections consistent at a minimum
with basic principles of humanity. Beyond that, states should apply
the list of minimal protections found in Article 7 5 of Protocol I
to any captured suspected terrorist. This list currently applies to
anyone in the control of a party to an interstate conflict who does
not enjoy better treatment under other parts of the Convention
and Protocol. These include the basic human right to a trial for
suspected crimes.
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In summary, as a predictive matter, it seems exceedingly
unlikely that states will agree to a significant revision or augmen tation of the laws of war to address the sorts of unconventional
threats posed by transnational groups such as Al Qaeda. To date,
only a very small part of those activities that some states refer to
as terrorism - guerrilla warfare as part of a legitimate war of
national liberation - has come under the protection of international humanitarian treaties. The remainder of unconventional
activity is still subject to baseline principles of humanity, and
states see little reason to grant more. Protocol I was expanded to
cover liberation movements because a group of states - those in
the developing world
insisted upon such protections. Al Qaeda
and other groups have no such vocal constituency, however, as
much as some states may support them sub silencio. If, for some
reason, enough states were to find the absence of treaty law in
the war on terrorism an unacceptable gap, a Protocol III is likely
to be far more limited than Protocol II turned out to be. Indeed,
I suspect it will do nothing beyond recognizing the most basic
principles of humanity.
As a normative matter, any codification that goes beyond the
obvious principles of humanity is at best premature. The legitimization function accomplished through codification sends a signal
to these unconventional fighters that their tactics are acceptable
- that they are lawful combatants, even if they consider their
great victories to be crashing a plane into a commercial building
or incapacitating a major city via germ or chemical weapons. The
immediate threat to public order around the world from groups
whose mission is to create civilian casualties - who themselves
reject the most basic principles of the law of war - argues against
enveloping their activities in a set of detailed law of war norms.
Any such process will do little to protect the victims of such acts,
as those people are already illegitimate targets under international
criminal law, humanitarian law, and human rights law. So it seems
to benefit only one side in the conflict. Whatever protections
those fighting colonialism may have deserved, Al Qaeda and its
allies fall into a completely different category.
Surely, governments need to figure out some limits to armed
conflict as a geographic and temporal matter, and academic and
governmental discussion of such issues can help elaborate whether
the existing norms work or need some further elaboration . But
beyond that, as long as those fighting terrorism respect the basic
principles of humanity in that struggle, international humanitarian
law ought to live with something close to the status quo.
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